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4Information on the survey:
The survey Transatlantic Trends 2004 is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the
Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Luso−American Foundation, Fundacion BBVA, and the
Institute for Public Affairs (IVO). Collection of data and field co−ordination was conducted by the EOS Gallup Europe
agency network; in Slovakia, it was Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS) Slovakia.
The interviews were conducted between June 6 and June 24, 2004. In all countries, a random sample of approxi−
mately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, were interviewed. In Slovakia (as well as in Poland and
Turkey), the survey was implemented through face−to−face interviews, while in other countries it was using CATI
(Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews).
The report operates with certain summary data:
• Europe (EU) 9 – results for Europe, which comprise data from France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Nether−
lands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Slovakia.
• Europe (EU) 7 – in order to be able to compare the latest findings with those from 2003, we use a specific cat−
egory of “EU 7” that includes France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal, i.e.
those European countries that were surveyed also in 2003.
Europe−wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each of the countries surveyed.
Slovakia in the transatlantic context forms a supplement to the general report from the survey Transatlantic
Trends 2004 that had been elaborated by the international team under the GMF leadership. In order to paint
a complete picture of data from Slovakia, we have included also data produced by other surveys, especially
those conducted by the Institute for Public Affairs, as well as the series of surveys examining attitudes of the
Slovak public to NATO conducted by the National Education Centre – Institute for Researching Culture and
Public Opinion (NOC ÚVKVM) between 2001 and 2003.
5The transatlantic project was conceived in 2002. Less
than a year after the most tragic terrorism assault on the
territory of the United States, two American institutions
(the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations) conducted a
breakthrough survey called Worldviews 2002*. Its main
objective was to compare the views of Americans and
Europeans (particularly inhabitants of Great Britain,
France, Germany, Poland, Italy and the Netherlands) of
the issues of security, transatlantic partnership, securing
global stability, etc. Back then, of course, the survey’s
authors could not possibly anticipate that the largest
“transatlantic turbulence” was merely yet to come and
that the Iraqi crisis would divide the European and
American publics in a much more dramatic way than the
events of September 11.
The survey was repeatedly conducted in 2003 and
again it uniquely documented the recent shifts in peo−
ple’s opinions, not only on the America vs. Europe axis
but also within the “old” continent itself. The list of six
European countries originally examined in 2002 was en−
larged to include Portugal. Despite the inclusion, though,
the portrait of Europe was still far from complete, espe−
cially due to inadequate representation of Central and
Eastern European countries that continued to be repre−
sented only by the largest (and simultaneously the most
“pro−American”) Poland.
Nevertheless, the survey again met with a positive
response worldwide and in 2004 it was conducted again,
including further three countries: Spain – a country that
only recently experienced the horrors of a terrorism as−
sault by Al−Qaida, which spurred a change in the gov−
ernment and forced it to withdraw its contingent from
Iraq; Turkey – a country that is both geographically and
culturally located on the “boundary”, as it is a long−term

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NATO member but its application to join the EU has
been repeatedly turned down; and finally Slovakia – the
smallest (and youngest) of all countries participating in
the survey and a country that recently joined NATO and
the European Union (EU) and currently it is trying to find
its place in the enlarged Euro−Atlantic community.
While in previous years it was rather difficult to place
opinions of the Slovaks into the larger mosaic since we
had to use data from other surveys exploring similar is−
sues, this year the common comparative framework has
enabled us to see the Slovak society more clearly in the
international context.
The survey focuses on various issues of international
politics and security such as global threats, use of mili−
tary force, legitimacy of international institutions, trans−
atlantic relations, etc., that is, complex foreign policy
issues on the highest level. Generally speaking, the sur−
vey provided a rich empirical material that will take
some time before it is properly analyzed.
The following analysis focuses only on findings from
Slovakia, which are naturally compared to the broader
context of findings from other countries. In this sense,
Slovakia in the transatlantic context forms a supple−
ment to the general report from the survey Transat−
lantic Trends 2004 that had been elaborated by the in−
ternational team under the GMF leadership. In order to
paint a complete picture of data from Slovakia, we have
included also data produced by other surveys, especially
those conducted by the Institute for Public Affairs, as
well as the series of surveys examining attitudes of the
Slovak public to NATO conducted by the National Edu−
cation Centre – Institute for Researching Culture and
Public Opinion (NOC ÚVKVM) between 2001 and
2003.
* Similar issues of global importance are regularly examined by another international comparative survey conducted annually by Pew Research
Center from the United States.
6 The survey Transatlantic Trends 2004 examined the
public opinion in the United States and Europe one
year after launching military operations in Iraq that
highlighted and deepened the “transatlantic gap”. The
results of the survey indicate that one year since the
beginning of the Iraqi conflict and in spite of all that
has been said and done, many Europeans still wish to
remain on friendly terms with the United States; at the
same time, though, they wish to play a more independ−
ent and self−reliant role in global developments.
 The opinions of Slovak citizens who were included
in the survey for the first time formed part of the col−
ourful palette of other European countries’ public
opinion. In some issues, the Slovaks did not differ
much from the European public opinion mainstream,
while in others they departed that mainstream. The
backgrounds of these specifics seem to have differ−
ent but easily “traceable” and explainable roots.
 As far as their attitude to future transatlantic co−op−
eration goes, the Slovaks fit smoothly into the greater
European picture: while most Slovak citizens believe
that the United States and the European Union do
have enough common values to be able to co−oper−
ate in the future, they also maintain that the EU stand−
point should be more independent from that of the
USA. The European public is generally reserved
about the U.S. leadership role and expressed critical
views about the war in Iraq. In these particular key
issues, Slovakia seems to be closer to those European
countries that are more critical on these issues.
 The Slovak public values the ethos of alliance and
subscribes to the principle of multilateralism. How−
ever, the Slovaks are below the European average
when it comes to acknowledging the necessity of
NATO for their country’s security; also, they are
somewhat less ready to endorse the country’s mili−
tary involvement in defending its ally.
 One of Slovakia’s most perceptible dissimilarities is
a comparatively higher proportion of inhabitants who
prefer their country keeping itself aloof from inter−
national affairs and taking a somewhat isolated stand−
point in respect to the outside world. Compared to the
average European, the average Slovak more emphati−
cally refuses the model of “a single world super−
power”. Most Slovaks believe that “no country
should be a superpower”. Also, Slovak citizens seem
to be less sensitive to certain global threats and less
likely to endorse the use of military force.
 Until the last year’s survey, new NATO members
were represented only by Poland, which is a specific
case due to its size but especially its traditionally
strong pro−Atlantic orientation. Although the Polish
support to the United States’ foreign policy has de−
clined significantly compared to 2003, Poland re−
mains a strong advocate of a pro−Atlantic Europe.
The public opinion in Poland and Slovakia was
similarly supportive of the respective country’s
NATO membership. But although this survey did
not produce any direct empirical evidence, other
surveys justify the conclusion that in respect to other
transatlantic issues, Slovakia seems to stand on the
position of defending the interests of smaller Cen−
tral and Eastern European countries as well as “nov−
ices” in the European Union and the North Atlan−
tic Alliance.

7In joining the EU and NATO, Slovakia has successfully
completed an important stage in its modern history. But
for Slovakia, this step does not mean “the end of his−
tory”; quite the contrary, the upcoming stage is likely
to be equally important but much more complex and
demanding of the extent and depth of internal resources
of the country’s foreign policy. The variety of goals, is−
sues, questions and challenges is likely to increase and
not decline. Such a hypothesis can be corroborated by
at least two facts: first, the very accession to mentioned
international institutions, which makes Slovakia part of
a larger entity, its active player, partner and opponent;
second, the generally very dynamic international situ−
ation whose most typical features include emergence
of new threats and continuing search for a new world
order.
Slovakia is a small Central European country, which
has in its modern history experienced a number of re−
gimes, state formations and an abundance of historical
discontinuity. Furthermore, its historical memory re−
members too well that its fate has been too often decided
outside its borders. Together with the feelings of small−
ness and unimportance, this historical heritage is at the
root of people’s generally weaker interest in world de−
velopments and foreign policy whose understanding
requires a certain level of awareness and experience.
The key decision−makers in the field of foreign policy
are certainly members of the elite and various institu−
tions; however, an increasingly important role is played
by civil society associations that represent the public in
the broadest sense of the word. Here, the country also
has to catch up with deficits stemming from the lack of
experience and information, as well as the inadequate
contextual perception of international political context
or the underdeveloped public debate on international
issues. The country’s long−term position on the waiting
list and its endeavour to close the gap behind its neigh−
bours is only gradually evolving into a “full−fledged
membership identity”. Therefore, it is very important to
know how people perceive chief foreign policy issues
and context.
When reading and interpreting the survey Transatlan−
tic Trends 2004, one must realize that it compared Slo−
vakia to countries that have a long tradition of playing
an active role in international politics; most of them are
established democracies with functioning market
economy where foreign policy issues are strongly
present in public debates on domestic issues.
Therefore, one’s expectations should be adjusted to
this reality. Compared to inhabitants of other countries,
Slovak respondents more frequently answered “I don’t
know” or “I don’t have an opinion”, which is a natural
consequence of their inadequate awareness of issues
examined by the survey. The survey exposed informa−
tion deficits within the public opinion. But the deficits
that can be found on the level of ordinary people merely
reflect the deficits on the level of the local elite. It is
important that the gradual opening of the country’s elite
to the outside world is subsequently transferred into its
social conscience. Like in the process of establishing
democratic principles and market economy, the coun−
try’s elite is bound to play a pivotal role in the process
of preparing Slovakia to new challenges stemming from
its new position in the international context. One can
already see certain progress in the Slovaks’ understand−
ing of market economy and democracy principles; simi−
larly, their understanding of international relations and
context is likely to take some time.
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8What role do the Slovaks desire for their country to play
in international relations in the future? According to the
survey, almost three in five respondents (59%) believe
it is better for Slovakia’s future if it actively participates
in world developments. One in four respondents argued
that Slovakia should keep itself aloof from international
affairs and take a rather isolated or at least “non−inter−
ventionist” approach, in line with a popular saying “let
sleeping dogs lie”. Naturally, the share of pro−active citi−
zens in each particular country is also determined by its
size, its foreign policy “weight” and ensuing ambitions
on the “international chessboard”. The share of pro−ac−
tive citizens in Slovakia is lower than in large European
countries; their country’s active role in international af−
fairs was desired by 59% of Slovaks compared to 88%
of French, 83% of Spaniards and 75% of Poles. Never−
theless, an important message for Slovakia’s political
representation is that a majority of Slovak citizens do not
wish to see Slovakia standing aside and pursuing an
ostrich−like foreign policy.
	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Graph 1
Do you think it will be best for the future of your country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we
stay out of world affairs? (% “take active part”)
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Legend: EU 9 = results for nine European countries (see “Information on the survey”); FR = France; GER = Germany;
UK = The United Kingdom; IT = Italy; NL = The Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; SP= Spain; SK = Slovakia;
TR = Turkey. These abbreviations are used in all graphs and tables in this text.
9When examining their perception of existing or poten−
tial world superpowers, the Slovaks showed a certain
“anti−superpower” reflex. When asked which country
should be the world’s leading superpower, most Slovak
respondents (57%) answered that “no country should be
a superpower”. The occurrence of this answer was sev−
eral times higher in Slovakia than in other European
countries. For most respondents, it expressed their pref−
erence of international co−operation and complementary
leadership to dominance of one country. For some mem−
bers of the older generation, this opinion may reflect the
“anti−Soviet resentment”, while for some younger peo−
ple it may stem from the lack of political realism, a ro−
mantic idea of neutrality, etc. However, when asked
which of the two natural superpowers – i.e. the European
Union or the United States – should be the world’s lead−
ing superpower, more than one in three Slovaks (36%)
preferred the former while only one in 33 (3%) favoured
the latter.
As far as the concept of transatlantic relationship is
concerned, Slovakia seems to fit into the general Euro−
pean pattern. Most Slovaks believe that the United States
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Graph2
EU and US cooperation on international problems
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and the European Union share enough values to be able
to co−operate in solving international problems; while
52% of Slovak respondents agreed with the assertion,
29% refused it (graph2).
However, when put in the sink or swim situation –
i.e. when asked “in terms of Slovakia´s vital interests
which are more important EU or US?” – an overwhelm−
ing majority of Slovaks preferred the European Union
to the United States. Like other Europeans, the Slovaks
also believe that the EU should become more independ−
ent from the USA in security and diplomatic issues. In
this respect, 54% Slovaks matched the thin majority of
Italians (59%), Dutch (56%) or French (55%). On the
contrary, only 38% of Polish respondents supported
greater independence of the EU. Two in three Slovaks
believe that “Europe must acquire more military power
to be able to protect its interests independently from the
USA”, which also corresponds to the average share in
EU−9.
Another question from the set of questions focusing
on the future of transatlantic relations revealed certain
vigilance or aloofness of the Slovaks, but also other
10
Europeans, in respect to the current U.S. leadership.
When asked “How desirable is it that the United States
exert strong leadership in world affairs?” more than two
in three Slovaks (68%) responded negatively while
only one in five (21%) affirmatively. This attitude is
largely in line with that of the French, Germans or
Spaniards but in relative opposition to that of the Brit−
ish, Dutch and Poles. Generally speaking, the United
States as a strong leader in international issues are not
accepted in Europe anymore as the rate of acceptance
declined further compared to 2003; while in 2002 the
leadership role of the USA was endorsed by 64% of
EU−7 respondents, in 2004 that level of support de−
clined to 49%.
Graph 3
How desirable is it that the US exert strong leadership in world affairs? (% of „very+ somewhat desirable”)
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11
Currently, people’s perception of threats to global se−
curity is dramatically changing, with so−called asym−
metric security threats like international terrorism or
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction attracting
more attention. Perception of these types of threats
varies from country to country; the country’s concrete
experience plays an important role, although it is not
the only factor. Like in 2003, both sides of the Atlan−
tic agreed that international terrorism represents the
greatest threat. The Slovaks also perceive international
terrorism as the most serious of all security threats in
the portfolio; however, their level of sensitivity to glo−
bal security threats is somewhat lower than in other

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Table 1
“I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to Europe in the next 10 years. Please tell me
if you think each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important
threat at all.” (% of “extremely important threat” answers)
  	
 

 
  

 	 
 
 	  
 ! 
 	 	
   
"	   

 #  	 
European countries, not only in respect to international
terrorism but also other types of threats (please, see
Table 1).
Past surveys have indicated that the Slovaks are the
most concerned about living standard and corruption,
which corresponds to their long−term increased sensi−
tivity to social problems. In respect to security, the Slo−
vak public seems to care primarily about internal
sources of threats. On the contrary, international or
external threats or dangers that may come from beyond
the country’s border are viewed as less imminent. Al−
though people have grown more sensitive to them over
the past several years, they do not seem to realize the
Graph 4
Most appropriate way to fight terrorism (% of „strongly + somewhat agree” with „military action to eliminate
terrorist organizations” and „providing economic aid to raise living standards in countries where terrorists are re−
cruited”)

	



	 		




	







  
1+#+&")2"&+&$#+ +"&$&$)))+%&)"+3"&+%
)!+*+$ +"+*&)"+%$#+!+%&"*")*%+&)+$%
12
link between internal and external security. From the
viewpoint of external security, the Slovaks perceive
their country as safe. It remains a question whether
Slovak citizens subconsciously continue to perceive
security threats primarily as conventional threats, for
instance a military intervention.
A certain exception from this pattern of identifying
possible threats is the Slovaks’ perception of the inflow
of immigrants. Here, their level of sensitivity is com−
parable to other European nations, which may suggest
that this international problem has become reflected in
people’s perception of it as a possible internal security
problem.
Generally speaking, international terrorism is clearly
the most sensitively perceived global security threat;
however, the Europeans and Americans have slightly
different opinions on how to combat this threat. For in−
stance, only 45% of Slovaks and 49% of Europeans con−
sidered a military action to be the most effective way of
combating terrorism, while among the Americans this
rate was 63%. On the other hand, “soft means” such as
providing economic assistance to improve living condi−
tions in countries that are the principal sources of terror−
ists were endorsed by 46% of Slovaks, 51% of Europe−
ans and 49% of Americans. These are obviously the is−
sues that unite both sides of the Atlantic.
Table 2
“If there was UN/main European allies/NATO ap−
proval, would you be willing to use the country’s
armed forces to intervene in a foreign country in or−
der to eliminate the threat of a terrorist attack?”
(% of “yes” answers)
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Compared to Americans, the Europeans are generally
more prepared to dispatch their armed forces to tackle
post−intervention situations (i.e. peacekeeping or hu−
manitarian missions). But people on both sides of the
Atlantic seem to be in accord over endorsing preventive
employment of armed forces in case of an imminent ter−
rorism assault; such an intervention would be endorsed
by 83% of Europeans and 92% of Americans. Sending
off peacekeeping troops following a civil war was sup−
ported by 80% of Europeans and 66% of Americans,
while employment of troops to stop the fighting in a civil
war was supported by 56% Europeans and 38% of
Americans.
In Slovakia, people’s preparedness to endorse em−
ployment of armed forces in order to tackle various sce−
narios of security threats is generally lower. In this re−
spect, Slovakia does not fit into the bigger European
picture. More than five in six Slovaks (84%) would sup−
port military backup of humanitarian missions aimed at
helping war victims; however, only five in 12 Slovaks
(43%) would endorse sending off troops in order to pre−
vent an imminent terrorism assault.
The survey presented respondents with various hy−
pothetical scenarios involving the issues of using mili−
tary force to tackle security threats as well as these in−
terventions’ legitimacy. Provided there is an international
consensus over a military intervention to prevent an
imminent terrorism assault, a majority of Slovak citizens
would endorse it, although that majority would be thin−
ner compared to the EU−9 average or the USA.
Slovak respondents’ ideas about the issue of using
military force show a lack of explainable or consistent
pattern. On the one hand, “preventing an imminent ter−
rorism attack” would constitute a good cause for 43% of
respondents; on the other hand, “providing food and
medical assistance to war victims” but also “to stop fight−
ing in a civil war” would be considered a good cause by
over 80% of them. Therefore, a conclusion may be
drawn that the general Slovak public keeps significantly
blurry and inconsistent notions when it comes to endors−
ing the use of military force.
After all, this corresponds to the general lack of rel−
evant issues in the country’s public debate as well as its
historical and political experience. In the past, Slovakia
did not have to face many such decisions. Also, it is im−
possible to trace, with a satisfactory degree of certainty,
the reasons for respondents’ negative answers, i.e.
13
whether they were inspired by the lack of trust in effec−
tiveness of used military force, principal disagreement
or intuitive opposition to force solutions.
Respondents’ answers to another set of questions
examining their opinions on legitimacy of using military
force and just causes for war confirm that the Slovaks
are generally more reluctant to endorse the use of power
Graph 5
Use of force (% of „strongly + somewhat agree”)
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than inhabitants of other European countries. If people
were divided into two principal types – so−called
“hawks” and “doves” – then the Slovaks would certainly
be closer to the “dove” type (please, see Graph 5). As
other findings indicate, though, their “dovelike nature”
tends to give way to a clear international consensus over
using military force.

			
Three in four Slovaks believe that “when our country
acts on a national security issue, it is critical that we do
so together with our closest allies”. The ethos of alliance
is strong among the Slovaks and their support of allies
and the principle of multilateralism is high on the gen−
eral level. An international institution that has tradition−
ally high credibility in Slovakia is the United Nations
(UN). According to the survey, two in three respondents
think positively of the UN, which is very similar to the
institution’s perception in Poland.
The UN mandate – like that of main European allies
– increases the legitimacy of possible military operations
in the eyes of the public. The context of these findings
was somewhat disturbed by the fact that 55% of respond−
ents agreed (completely or partly) with the following
statement: “When vital interests of our country are in−
volved, it is justified to bypass the UN.” In other Euro−
pean countries, the rate of respondents’ approval was
lower.
While testing various scenarios of security threats and
legitimacy of military interventions, the survey revealed
Table 3
“If a situation like Iraq arose in the future, do you
think it is essential to secure the approval of the UN/
main European allies/NATO before using military
force, or don’t you think it is essential?” (% of “it
would be essential” answers)
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the rate of public support drops to 24%. Hypothetically,
if a situation similar to the Iraqi conflict occurs again, a
mandate from international institutions will be important
to the Slovaks.
	
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Graph 6
Is NATO essential to our country’s security or not? (% of positive responses)
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that the public support for keeping the Slovak military
contingent in Iraq would be significantly greater if the
UN issued a mandate for multinational forces to over−
see the project of Iraq’s reconstruction (42%). As soon
as that mandate is connected to U.S. military command,
In spring 2004, Slovakia formally became a full−
fledged member of NATO. Public opinion polls con−
ducted before the accession indicated that the key ar−
gument in favor of the country’s NATO membership
was greater security but also political stability, eco−
nomic prosperity and strengthening Slovakia’s interna−
tional position. According to the survey Transatlantic
Trends 2004, almost half of Slovak citizens (47%) con−
siders the Alliance important for Slovakia’s security;
more than one third (37%) disagreed, while almost one
in six respondents (16%) did not have an opinion. In
European countries that have been members of NATO
for a long time, the share of people who view NATO
as an important part of their security is significantly
higher; for instance in Germany, the Netherlands and
Great Britain, it hovers at 70%. But in Poland, which
became a full−fledged member in 1999, the public sup−
port of NATO is 52%, a figure comparable with that of
Slovakia.
The mentioned public opinion polls also examined citi−
zens’ perception of obligations stemming from their coun−
try’s NATO membership. Toward the end of 2002, most
respondents agreed with participation of Slovak troops in
peacekeeping missions abroad; the ratio of people’s ac−
ceptance/disapproval of the obligation to send Slovak
troops to defend another NATO member state was 47%
to 49%. The survey Transatlantic Trends 2004 established
that this ratio has not changed much, as only one in two
respondents accepted the obligation. This finding indi−
cates that a significant share of the Slovaks still have not
identified themselves with Slovakia’s NATO membership.
This inevitably leads to a question whether the Slovak
public is prepared for the fact that as a NATO member,
Slovakia will not be only a passive consumer of security
but also an active provider and guarantor of its allies’ se−
curity. The experience of e. g. the Czech Republic is that
the share of people identified with their country’s NATO
membership has increased since the country’s accession.
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Reactions of the Slovaks on the war in Iraq were simi−
lar to those of other European nations – at the turn of
March and April 2003, three in four Slovak citizens
(74%) viewed the military intervention against Iraq as
wrong. More than year and a half after the intervention
and 14 months since the main military campaign ended,
this structure of public opinion has not changed much.
According to the Transatlantic Trends 2004 survey con−
ducted at the beginning of June 2004, only one in five
Slovak citizens (21%) endorsed the presence of the Slo−
vak contingent in Iraq while seven in ten citizens (71%)
disapproved it. The government’s decision to send off
troops is backed by a small but relatively solid core. The
survey did not record any significant change in the sup−
port, although it was conducted shortly after three Slo−
vak soldiers died in Iraq.
Based on the public opinion, the six European coun−
tries that dispatched troops to Iraq can be divided in two
groups. In Slovakia (21%), Poland (24%) and Portugal
(28%), the executive decision to send off troops to Iraq
enjoys a minority support, while in Great Britain, Italy
and the Netherlands the camps of the decision’s advo−
cates and opponents are relatively even.
In Germany and France, people emphatically back
their political leaders’ decision not to dispatch any troops
to Iraq, with approximately 90% of the public support−
ing it. A special case is Spain, which withdrew its con−
tingent following a terrorism assault in Madrid and in−
auguration of the new administration. This decision is
supported by three in four Spanish citizens.
Like in other European countries, there is growing
skepticism in Slovakia regarding the effect of the Iraqi war
on the international campaign against terrorism. On the
contrary, most people in Europe tend to believe that the
military intervention has aggravated the threat of terrorism
assaults (74% in Slovakia, 73% in the EU−9). This opinion
certainly has to do with the lingering security crisis in Iraq.
The increasing criticism aimed at the war in Iraq is
also reflected in doubts over whether the intervention’s
outcome was worth the sacrificed lives and other costs
spent during the intervention. In June 2004, only 15%
of Europeans (16% in Slovakia) believed it was worth
it while in 2003 their share was 25%. The European
skepticism is shared by more and more Americans
whose support of the intervention declined from 55% in
2003 to 44% a year later.
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Many people seem to personalize European criticism of
the United States and their foreign policy with President
George W. Bush. But is it fair to interchange the current
wave of anti−Americanism with anti−Bushism?
Earlier surveys conducted in Slovakia seem to cor−
roborate it. Most Slovaks perceive the United States
positively (although Europe is perceived much more
favourably); at the same time, most Slovaks are criti−
cal of foreign policy pursued by the Bush administra−
tion. There is a relevant group of those Slovaks who
criticize the United States’ current foreign policy and
simultaneously have a positive relation toward the
country. A similar pattern is obvious from the results
of Transatlantic Trends 2004: almost three in four Slo−
vak citizens (72%) do not agree with how the President
of the United States treats international politics, while
less than one in four (22%) Slovaks agree. This ratio
of opinions put Slovakia almost right in the middle of
the 10 examined European countries (76% to 21%);
however, one should realize the profound differences
between particular European countries. On one pole is
France where 86% of people criticize Bush; on the
16
Earlier surveys suggest that most Slovaks do not per−
ceive the United States negatively but rather as a clean
slate, a country that has no relation to their nation’s his−
tory. For example, in a survey conducted in 2002 a half
of respondents could not name a single historic event or
moment at which the history of the two nations would
collide in good or in bad. The Slovaks’ collective
memory does not seem to include American aviators
from World War II, the Marshall Plan, the role of the
United States in defeating communism or the subsequent
American assistance in the process of restoring democ−
racy in Slovakia. This problem does not apply only to
this specific part of historical memory but seems to have
a more general applicability.
other pole is Poland where, despite the recent drop in
the public support for Bush´s international policies, the
camps of his critics and opponents are the most bal−
anced of all examined countries (51% of critics to 42%
of supporters).
When examining the Slovaks’ feelings toward par−
ticular countries or groups of countries on a scale of 100
(the so−called feeling thermometer where 100 means
very warm, pleasant and positive feelings while zero
expresses very cold, unpleasant and negative feelings),
one will find out that the United States are placed right
in the middle, that is, behind Germany, France and the
European Union but before Israel, Turkey, China and
other countries.

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Graph 7
Do you approve or disapprove of the way the President of the United States George W. Bush is handling
international policies? (% of „very much + somewhat approve)


 


 


	





	



           
Like Slovakia, Turkey was incorporated into the Trans−
atlantic Trends survey in 2004. The results indicated
several areas where Turkey differs from the public opin−
ion mainstream of EU member states and revealed that
its inhabitants have a very reserved attitude toward the
United States and transatlantic alliance. Also, Turkey
portrayed itself as a country with above−average public
support for using military force and bypassing interna−
tional institutions.
When examining the issue of Turkey’s possible EU
membership, the survey revealed significant ambiva−
lence of attitudes in all nine EU member states. This
applies particularly to countries that are newcomers to
the EU. For instance, 31% of Slovak and 21% of Polish
17
respondents answered “I don’t know” when asked
about Turkey’s possible EU membership; further 38%
and 37%, respectively, did not view the issue either
positively or negatively, saying it would be “neither
good nor bad”. This part of the survey showed that an
important dimension of Slovakia’s recently acquired
international status will be forming the public opinion
in respect to a whole variety of new issues, such as the
controversial issue of Turkey’s full−fledged EU mem−
bership.
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The survey identified a number of differences and simi−
larities between both sides of the Atlantic but also within
Europe and America themselves. A variety of opinions
regarding foreign policy and security issues was docu−
mented also within Slovak society. Education seems to
be a strong differentiation factor, while age did not pro−
duce as glaring differences. Over several issues, respond−
ents were primarily divided along ideological lines and
party affiliations. This applies particularly to their atti−
tudes to U.S. policies, the war in Iraq or Slovakia’s
NATO membership. For instance, the presence of the
Slovak contingent in Iraq is approved by 35% of ruling
coalition parties’ supporters but only 14% of parliamen−
tary opposition parties’ sympathizers. The public opin−
ion is similarly polarized over foreign policy pursued by
the U.S. President George W. Bush. Also, supporters of
governing parties more frequently tend to advocate Slo−
vakia’s active role in world developments and perceive
the North Atlantic Alliance as the cornerstone of the
country’s security. Generally speaking, the survey cor−
roborated the division lines previously identified by
other surveys examining people’s attitudes to Slovakia’s
integration. On the contrary, the “opinion gap” seems to
be much narrower when it comes to people’s perception
of global security threats, use of military force, the role
of superpowers or U.S. vs. EU leadership.
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For quite some time before its actual accession to the
North Atlantic Alliance, Slovakia acted as a de facto ally,
for instance by dispatching its military contingent as part
of multinational forces in Iraq. The survey Transatlantic
Trends 2004 documents the public opinion in Slovakia in
year one so to speak, i.e. the year when it became a full−
fledged member of NATO and the EU. The process of
getting used to its new role and new responsibility will be
gradual and lengthy. The survey enables us to compare the
Slovak society with key players of world politics from the
angle of public opinion and, in the future, measure the path
the country has covered. However, the principal objective
of participating in the survey was not only to analyze opin−
ions of the Slovak public but also to encourage the pub−
lic debate on important foreign policy issues, such as glo−
bal security and Slovakia’s contribution to it.
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